Ukraine's secret agents inside Russia: sabotage, surveillance and the fight against Putin

Two Russian men secretly working for Ukraine's military intelligence have given rare accounts of operations they claim to have carried out against military assets and personnel inside Russia, offering a glimpse into the shadowy world of anti-Putin sabotage.

One of the men, whom the BBC is calling Ivan, claims to have played a role from Russian soil in Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories. He features in a BBC World Service documentary by the independent Polish journalist Marcin Mamon.

The film also features a man we are calling Foma, a Russian living in exile in Poland. He runs a network of undercover volunteers inside Russia who surveil high-level officers that the GUR—Ukraine's military intelligence service—is considering targeting, he says. He stresses that his people are never involved in the attacks themselves.

Foma was tight-lipped about whom his network was watching, but after Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov was assassinated in Moscow in December last year, he admitted he had supplied the Ukrainians with intelligence on the officer. Previous media reports have described Russian sabotage groups, but access to someone operating on the ground, as Ivan does, is rare.

The GUR confirmed that both men work for the agency, while acknowledging it cannot know the full picture. When Ivan's handler was pressed on whether the saboteur could be trusted, he replied: "I'm not sure of anyone, except myself." Both the agency and the men are cautious about how much detail they share, making it impossible to verify their claims.

The broad tactics they describe, however, have been acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities. Kyiv has spoken of its strategy of co-ordinated drone attacks on what it claims are legitimate targets inside Russia, and has acknowledged using secret agents to carry them out. Several political assassinations have taken place in Russia since the start of the war. As a matter of policy, Ukraine never officially admits or claims responsibility for targeted attacks, though a Ukrainian intelligence officer previously admitted to the BBC that Kyiv was behind the killing of Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov in December 2024.

It is difficult to establish how many Russians are engaged in this kind of work for Ukraine. According to Foma, the number is about 300 to 500, though this cannot be verified.

Ivan and Foma say they oppose not only Russia's war in Ukraine but President Vladimir Putin's regime, and believe his political future depends on the war's outcome. "At the moment... I think the [Putin] regime might fall if they lose the war… Through our actions... we are trying to speed this up," Ivan says.

His work, he told Mamon, involved surveilling military sites and locating places to hide drone components in preparation for potential attacks on Russian assets. "When these [drone] components are combined… it turns out a formidable weapon, which with a single blow can destroy an object that costs many, many millions of dollars," he said. He sent Mamon a video apparently showing him hiding explosives near a Russian military airfield. Had he been caught, he would have been charged with terrorism and jailed for decades.

Foma's work is different. He operates remotely, training his volunteers inside Russia online. Mamon watched one tutorial on how to trail a senior military official marked for surveillance. "You will get a file... from me or a colleague… with the proposed target," Foma told his volunteers. "When you go to the target, don't take a phone."

Once part of the Russian elite, Foma claims a unique set of contacts and a constant flow of insider information. He showed Mamon on his laptop how he mapped military targets. "This shows a database... the location of storage warehouses, and military units. Where generals live… Where the pilots of strategic bombers who shell Ukraine live," he said. "In order to break the system, you need to understand how it works. Then you can aim for their weak points."

He said his network comprised about "three dozen" people split between Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, with those outside Russia providing logistical support such as tracking targets' digital footprints. Foma stressed that the GUR suggests whom to surveil, but that his team independently checks that the individuals should be considered military criminals. "As a rule… we also check the data [on that person]… Only after that we say whether we work or not."

He argued that his team's actions were justified. "I want people who do terrible things on behalf of Putin and Russia in Ukraine… to understand that they'll have to pay for it. I want them to get scared." He insisted he passes only intelligence to the Ukrainians and that his network carries out no assassinations itself. Of General Sarvarov's killing in December 2025, he later texted Mamon: "Keeping track of him took quite an effort. He lived alternately with his mistress and his colleague. Covered his tracks and constantly changed his schedule."

Foma did his own digging on Ivan. After checking with military intelligence contacts in both Ukraine and Russia, he concluded it likely that Ivan had been involved in a plan to strike Russia's largest military drone factory at Yelabuga in June last year, an incident in which one person was reported killed. Ivan stressed that the aim is always to avoid harming civilians. Operations have clearly been risky for him too. "The most serious case was when my car was stopped for inspection and I had the handmade explosives on me," he said. "The risk was very high—however as you can see, I was not detected."

To reduce the risk of compromise, "there is no clear structure" to the work, he said, adding that he had never met and did not know the identity of others working alongside him. Foma applies the same rule to his operatives. "As soon as you start gathering people in groups, in general chats… leaving a mark on the internet, with a high probability this whole group will be quickly detained or destroyed," he said.

Ivan stressed that few people remained in Russia suitable for such work. "Most of the ideological people have either left the country or are already behind bars," he said. Many Russians involved in sabotage on their native soil are therefore either unwitting—lorry drivers unaware that their cargoes have been compromised, for instance—or paid, the BBC understands. Ivan says he acts for ideological reasons; he was once a member of the political opposition, and his movements would be expected to be monitored closely by the Russian authorities. That he managed to leave and re-enter Russia frequently was therefore a surprise.

Mamon persuaded Ivan to drive him into the Georgian desert, where they could speak freely, and asked how the Ukrainians could trust him. "You go to a third country… where [Ukraine's] agents meet you… and conduct lie detector tests," Ivan replied. Mamon asked to be put in touch with one of Ivan's GUR handlers, and the man immediately rang Ivan on speakerphone, apparently demonstrating the relationship. They spoke in code, referring to "repairs at the school". Later, however, the handler admitted he could not rule out the possibility that Ivan worked for the Russians too, either voluntarily or under duress.

Foma believes Ivan's freedom to travel is not necessarily a red flag. "There are all sorts of holes in [the country's governance], and if you know them, or are just lucky, then you can jump through the holes… and live in the system. Like a mouse in a piece of cheese," he said. Perhaps more compellingly, had Ivan also been spying for the FSB, he would likely have shared what he knew of Ukraine's attack plans with the Russian agency. More than a year before a devastating strike by more than 100 Ukrainian drones, Ivan had told Marcin there would be a major attack on strategic bombers at military airfields across Russia, though he never said when or where.

Mamon asked Ivan how he coped with the work. "Fear is always present," he said. "It follows me everywhere. Even if you don't do anything, you're still afraid. This is Russia." But he was optimistic that eventually his life would change. "Putin won't live forever," he said.