The Kremlin Prepares for a Second Mobilisation — but Russians Are Turning Against It

After the first wave of compulsory mobilisation in 2022 provoked broad opposition and an exodus of young men, the Russian authorities did their homework. They are now considerably better prepared for the next round, which many observers expect may follow the Duma elections of 18 to 20 September. Yet surveys conducted by the Kyiv-based Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia show that opposition is not merely high but rising. Many Russians are deeply unhappy at the prospect, and Putin's inner circle, for all its tight control of information and communications, will have to reckon with that hostility. Finding ways out of the country for fighting-age children has become an urgent topic of conversation among middle-class Russians in Moscow and St Petersburg.

Negative attitudes towards compulsory mobilisation hardened after the first wave in the autumn of 2022, and the share of Russians opposed to a repeat has held at around three-quarters of the population since early 2024. Support for conscription, meanwhile, has continued to fall, from 24 per cent in early 2023 to 11 per cent in 2026, and differences between age groups have narrowed, according to the tenth update to IKAR's sociological monitoring of Russian opinion. An absolute majority of young Russians has always been opposed, while older generations were once more willing to back mass mobilisation. Today the gaps have closed: an absolute majority in every age group opposes a second wave, at 68 per cent among the elderly, 72 per cent among the middle-aged and 80 per cent among the young.

The Kremlin has only itself to blame. It has provided neither an ideological foundation for the war that a majority of Russians accepts nor a clear vision of victory. The first omission matters less while the army relies on contract recruitment, but it will become critical if conscription is enforced. The absence of any prospect of victory damages both society's view of mobilisation and the willingness of large numbers of citizens to sign military contracts. It pushes demobilisation indefinitely into the future and raises the perceived likelihood of death or serious injury. The British chief of staff said on 11 September that Russian military casualties had now reached 1.5 million. In short, compulsory mobilisation with no end in sight is a deeply undesirable prospect for most Russians.

The Kremlin's bureaucracy prepares regardless. The Ministry of Defence has improved its capacity to track citizens liable for mobilisation, compiling current information on home addresses, workplaces and social circles, while imposing a range of restrictive measures, including bans on leaving the country even through Belarus, an ally in the war against Ukraine. Employers, both state and private, will play a far greater role than in 2022, notifying employees and ensuring that those wanted for military service report to enlistment offices. The capacity to geolocate those called up has improved, making it harder for them to evade mobilisation by moving from their registered address or to another part of the country. Universities will also play their part, and many have already become platforms for persuading students to sign military contracts. They will serve as assembly points for young men required at the front.

Recruitment agencies are increasingly used to find men willing to sign military contracts, with spending on such efforts rising to an average of 802m rubles a month in the first four months of 2026, against 358m rubles a month in 2025. Should forced mobilisation come, the agencies will be used to bring wanted men to military recruitment offices. The recruitment system already targets men across society who might be willing or pressured to sign: prisoners, conscripts, reservists, foreign nationals, migrants, recent recipients of Russian citizenship, debtors and those facing criminal or administrative proceedings. But the contract system has reached its ceiling, both in the monthly number of contracts signed and in the quality of the manpower it attracts. Regional payments also differ enormously, with recruits in Penza region receiving 400,000 rubles against 3.7m rubles in the Khanty-Mansi autonomous district.

The exhaustion of the previous model for replacing frontline losses, alongside the high degree of readiness for mass mobilisation, makes compulsory conscription a logical next step for the Kremlin once the elections are out of the way. Hence its efforts to construct a comprehensive system of military socialisation spanning preschool, school and higher education. The ultimate goal is to raise generations for whom war and mass mobilisation are regarded as normal, even expected, features of life. Russian society is capable of enduring continuing economic deterioration, declining purchasing power, internet restrictions, fuel shortages, drone attacks and, most likely, disruptions to electricity and heating supplies. But it does appear to have one red line: that participation in the war should not be compulsory. For all the Kremlin's preparations, it does not know how its people will respond to being forced to the frontline, or to their loved ones being sent there.