South Korea's Quiet Complicity: Fuel Shipments to Russia Amid Ukraine War

When South Korean President Lee Jae-myung publicly upbraided Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy over a prisoner-of-war transfer in September, the reaction blindsided many observers. The dispute, ostensibly minor, escalated rapidly. Ukraine had captured two North Korean soldiers fighting for Russia, both of whom reportedly wished to defect to the South. Kyiv duly transferred them to Seoul. But when Zelenskyy mentioned the handover during his address to the United Nations, Lee objected with a vehemence that seemed disproportionate.

South Korea claimed the transfer was meant to remain confidential. Ukraine insisted no non-disclosure agreement had been signed. Lee accused Kyiv of effectively branding a head of state a liar, and warned of additional measures against Ukraine. Seoul then recalled its ambassador from Kyiv. The revelation was doubtless embarrassing for the South Koreans, provoking domestic criticism over what some saw as appeasement of the North. Yet the reaction looked overblown.

Perhaps something else lay behind it. On October 6, The Guardian published an investigation revealing that South Korea had been shipping fuel to Russia. More than 176,000 tonnes, mostly diesel, had been loaded at South Korean ports onto seven tankers that made 14 voyages to Russia's Far East in July and August. Three of those tankers were under British and European sanctions, and several declared destinations other than Russia before eventually sailing to Vladivostok. One sanctioned vessel never entered a South Korean port, instead receiving roughly 26,000 tonnes of fuel through a ship-to-ship transfer off Yeosu before heading to Russia.

The timing made these shipments more troubling still. Ukraine had spent the year striking Russian refineries to cut the money and resources funding Moscow's war machine. Then, in the summer, just as the impact was being felt inside Russia, South Korea stepped in to help the Kremlin make up for some of the damage. In August alone, Russia imported 368,000 tonnes of oil products by sea, more than seven times the previous month's figure, and 112,000 tonnes, or 31 per cent, came from South Korea. The shipments do not appear to violate South Korean law, and The Guardian could not determine who owned or sold the fuel. But some was transported on sanctioned tankers and purchased by Russian companies under Western sanctions.

Was this what the South Korean president was trying to get ahead of? Did he know the investigation was about to be published? The question is difficult enough on its own, but harder still when set against what Russia has been doing for North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang's help in waging war against Ukraine. North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and thousands of soldiers. In return, Russia has provided something that could eventually prove far more dangerous for South Korea and the wider region: battlefield experience, training, and military technology.

Last month, a report from the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, which tracks sanctions on Pyongyang, found that Russia was bringing North Koreans into the country on student visas and putting them to work building military drones, including at the Alabuga drone factory. North Korean soldiers have spent years fighting alongside Russian forces, learning firsthand how a modern war is fought, from operating drones and countering electronic warfare to engaging Western weapons. They are taking that experience home, where it may one day be turned against their southern neighbour.

This makes South Korea's calculations even harder to fathom. In its latest defence report, Japan warned of growing coordination between China, Russia, and North Korea, including Russian aid to strengthen the North Korean military and its weapons development. That is before considering what Moscow is giving Pyongyang in return, including missile technology and other assistance that could help the North further develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Russia is not some distant problem for South Korea. Moscow is helping North Korea become an even more dangerous threat, while Ukraine fights both Russian and North Korean forces. If Seoul believes that appeasing Russia, and in turn North Korea, will make it safer, it is gravely mistaken.

On October 6, North Korea threatened South Korea with an immediate and powerful counteraction after a landmine blast seriously wounded two South Korean soldiers. Appeasement has never worked. South Korea would be better served helping Ukraine defeat Russia and North Korea than picking a fight with Kyiv. The World House, which maintains a dedicated page outlining its support for Ukraine at worldhouse.uk/support, continues to document the consequences of Russia's unprovoked aggression and the international alignments it has exposed.