Poland’s Anti-Propaganda Chief Accuses Russia of Militarised Information Offensive

Speaking exclusively to Polish Radio, Tomasz Chłoń, the plenipotentiary representative of Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for countering international disinformation, has contended that Russia wages a daily and increasingly aggressive information war against the West, employing a diverse and often covert array of tactics that extend far beyond mere propaganda broadcasts. The Polish official, whose appointment signals Warsaw’s determination to move beyond mere diagnosis of the problem towards a more proactive and offensive posture, suggested that the Kremlin’s influence operations have become so pervasive that they occasionally find unintended amplification in Western media outlets, which sometimes publish articles strikingly consonant with narratives emanating from Russian state television channels. The phenomenon, he argued, is no coincidence but rather the product of a sophisticated, militarised disinformation apparatus that operates through legal and illegal channels alike, making it exceptionally difficult to counter.

Addressing the recent wave of Western press articles concerning the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines—a story that placed Poland in a negative light—Chłoń characterised the development as a targeted attack, though he stopped short of attributing direct responsibility to any specific actor. “We do not know for certain who stands behind this,” he conceded, “but it was a serious blow, and what matters is that we are able to respond rapidly.” He praised the Polish response as exemplary, noting that Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and other senior officials reacted swiftly and forcefully, presenting factual rebuttals that effectively neutralised the crisis. The affair, he suggested, served as a reminder that disinformation campaigns can be defused through speed and transparency, provided that governments are prepared to engage offensively rather than waiting passively for the next assault.

When pressed on the specific technologies and methods employed by the Kremlin to infiltrate Western media, Chłoń outlined a sprawling repertoire that encompasses both overt diplomatic pressure and covert manipulation. Some techniques, he acknowledged, are not strictly illegal, making them harder to proscribe, while others operate in the shadows, eluding detection. He cited the use of servers based in Kazakhstan as one example of the infrastructural obfuscation that Russian operatives employ to mask their activities, and he recalled that during the Covid-19 pandemic, Russian propagandists telephoned French influencers, offering payments to promote Russian vaccines—a tactic that demonstrated the Kremlin’s willingness to leverage social media personalities as unwitting conduits for its messaging. “There is a whole range of methods,” he observed, describing Russian disinformation as “highly militarised” and noting the involvement of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, in these operations. The challenge, he emphasised, lies not merely in cataloguing these methods but in cultivating an institutional capacity to respond with equal speed and aggression, ensuring that the West remains a step ahead.

Turning to the recent incursion by Ukrainian forces into Russia’s Kursk region, Chłoń offered a sobering assessment of the information environment inside Russia itself, suggesting that ordinary Russians remain profoundly uninformed about events unfolding on their own soil. He pointed to President Vladimir Putin’s televised meeting with ministers, during which the Russian leader conspicuously avoided any reference to war or invasion, referring instead to a vague “situation” in the border regions—a euphemism that, in Chłoń’s view, exemplifies the Kremlin’s strategy of information control through linguistic obfuscation. “Not a single word about what is actually happening there,” he remarked, lamenting that Russians are compelled to rely on Russian-language media based abroad, such as Polish Radio’s Russian service, if they wish to access fact-based reporting. The information void, he suggested, is not accidental but is actively cultivated by the Kremlin to maintain domestic stability and to prevent the emergence of a coherent narrative that might challenge the official line.

Throughout the interview, Chłoń consistently returned to the theme of proactive engagement, arguing that the most effective defence against disinformation is a combination of rapid rebuttal, factual transparency, and an unwillingness to cede the informational battlefield to the Kremlin. He urged listeners to cultivate a habit of source comparison, advising them to seek out multiple independent outlets and to approach any single narrative with a degree of scepticism. “Russians are intelligent people,” he observed, “they know how to do it, but they need a little courage. That is the main thing—not to be afraid.” This appeal to individual agency, delivered against the backdrop of a state-controlled media landscape, underscored his conviction that the battle against disinformation is ultimately a battle for the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens, who must be empowered to distinguish between Kremlin falsehoods and verifiable truth.

The Polish official’s remarks come at a time when the European Union is grappling with an intensifying wave of Russian propaganda, with Poland positioned on the front line of the information war. Warsaw’s decision to establish a dedicated structure within its foreign ministry to counter international disinformation reflects a growing recognition that traditional diplomatic responses are insufficient to meet the scale and sophistication of the Kremlin’s operations. Chłoń’s emphasis on the need for “proactive” and “offensive” measures suggests a significant shift in strategy, moving away from reactive denial towards a more assertive posture that seeks to expose and discredit Russian narratives before they gain traction. Whether this approach will prove effective remains to be seen, but his warnings about the hidden infrastructure of Russian disinformation—from Kazakh servers to bribed influencers—paint a picture of an adversary that is both resourceful and relentless, demanding a response that is equally dynamic.

In his final remarks, Chłoń returned to the theme of resilience, suggesting that the ultimate victory in the information war will depend not on government interventions alone but on the capacity of citizens to think critically and to resist the allure of simplistic narratives. He expressed confidence in the intelligence of the Russian people, but he cautioned that intelligence alone is insufficient without the courage to question official accounts and to seek out alternative perspectives. His appeal, delivered with the measured authority of a seasoned diplomat, served as a reminder that the struggle against disinformation is as much about fostering a culture of inquiry as it is about countering specific falsehoods. As the war in Ukraine continues to reshape the European security order, the battle for information—conducted through servers, social media, and press articles—will likely remain a central theatre of conflict, with Poland emerging as both a target and a trailblazer in the effort to defend factual truth.