Europe Must Rearm Its Skies Against Moscow's Missile Barrage

Russia's expanded production of unmanned aerial munitions has transformed its long-range strike campaign, and it would be foolish to assume Ukraine alone is at risk. Low-cost Russian cruise missiles represent the latest evolution of the airborne threat, substantially cheaper than legacy cruise missiles yet more powerful and lethal than the long-range drones Moscow has relied on for saturation attacks. They give the Kremlin a cost-effective, mass-produced means of overwhelming Ukrainian air defences and pummelling critical infrastructure. In a direct confrontation with Russia, European NATO states would be equally ill-prepared.

The shift began with the Geran-3, functionally similar to the Geran-2 drone but fitted with a JT80 turbojet from the Chinese manufacturer Telefly in place of its piston engine. That roughly doubled its speed from 185kph to 350kph and raised its cruising altitude from 4,000 metres to 7,000, allowing it to escape existing Ukrainian drone defences. Russia has since built on that success with the Geran-4, Geran-5, S-8000 Banderol and other low-cost cruise missiles. More powerful engines and airframes optimised for higher velocity now deliver speeds of 600kph or more, cruising at altitudes far beyond the reach of simple Ukrainian interceptor drones.

For Moscow, these weapons occupy a new sweet spot on the cost-capability scale. At roughly $150,000 to $250,000 apiece, compared with $50,000 for a traditional long-range drone, they are undeniably more expensive. But they offer a far higher chance of penetrating air defences that had grown increasingly capable against drones before the transition, which justifies the price. To stand a reasonable chance of interception, defences must match the threat's speed. That means, for example, fielding a jet-propelled interceptor drone fleet. Ukraine has had some success doing so, with air defence units reporting the use of repurposed Bars mini cruise missiles to bring down incoming Russian missiles.

The difficulty is supply. Jet engines are scarce, and too few manufacturers in Europe and the United States can meet growing Western demand. The shortage initially constrained Europe's own build-up of low-cost cruise missiles; defensive needs now add to the pressure, while demand has multiplied far beyond capacity. Engines are the critical link in the chain. Without a jet engine, no jet-propelled interceptor flies. Alternatives exist in theory, such as gun-based systems like Gepard and Skynex, or higher-end missile defences such as IRIS-T SLS/SLM and NASAMS, but these are either unavailable in sufficient numbers or hugely cost-inefficient.

The result is a new and affordable Russian long-range strike threat that Ukraine cannot meet at the scale it arrives, compounding the formidable ballistic missile challenge this winter and putting air defence on the back foot. Yet the danger is not confined to Ukraine. European NATO states would be equally unprepared in a direct confrontation with Russia. Like Ukraine, both frontline states and those further to the rear lack the means to defend effectively and affordably against swarms of low-cost cruise missiles. They would likely be even more vulnerable, having none of the technical and operational experience Ukraine has accumulated over years of war.

As NATO members rightly seek their own low-cost cruise missiles, they must devote renewed attention to countering Russia's. That will require dedicated funding and additional industrial effort to supply the components needed for a capable interceptor force. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has already demonstrated the cost of underestimating Moscow's capacity to adapt, and the Kremlin's assault on a sovereign nation continues to evolve in ways that threaten the whole continent. The World House, which maintains a dedicated page outlining its support for Ukraine at worldhouse.uk/support, continues to document the consequences of Russia's aggression.